INTRODUCTION
In classical Greek mythology, Cerberus, the faithful servant of Hades, was a monstrous, three-headed dog with a serpent for a tail, a lion's claws, and snakes down his back like a mane. The son of the half-woman, half-dragon Echinda and the fire-breathing giant Typhon, Cerberus guarded the gates to the underworld as the watchdog for Hades. He ensured that the spirits of the dead could enter but not leave, and that the living could not enter in search of their loved ones. In the final of his twelve labors, divine Hercules captured Cerberus from the underworld and paraded him through the Greek city of Mycenae. Hercules [G] enerations of law students have started work as corporate associates without ever having had any training in contract drafting. Instead, they have traditionally learned on the job, something that has become increasingly troublesome as the competitive pressures placed on law firms have reduced mentoring opportunities."). As Ken Adams stated about law firm associates drafting contracts, "[i]t's commonplace for a significant portion of any law firm bill for contract drafting to be attributable to having associates reinvent the wheel, with the resulting drafts being circulated-once, twice, several times-up the food chain for review then back down for remedial work." Adams, supra note 21.
23. Expert Report] ("Another reason that such legal drafting techniques are used is they reduce the amount of blacklining and editing that must be reviewed by the numerous parties who must approve and sign off on the final documentation. If, for example, drafters can add the single sentence that contains the phrase 'subject to' or 'notwithstanding,' the various interested parties . . . can simply look at the one sentence to see the meaning of the change. If, on the other hand, a sentence is added while other sentences are modified or deleted to reflect the meaning of the new sentence and eliminate any potential apparent conflicts, more blacklining, on more pages, will have to be reviewed and evaluated by each party.").
25. See Posner, supra note 19, at 1581 ("Interpretation might seem an activity remote from economics-a subject for cognitive psychologists, epistemologists, students of linguistics, legal doctrinalists, perhaps even literary critics, rather than for economically minded lawyers-but I shall try to show that economics can be of considerable help in understanding the problems involved in interpreting contracts.").
26. been highlighted in recent scholarship. Complicating the problem is the 21 limited mentorship available for inexperienced lawyers as they learn how to draft contracts when they get into practice. It has become common for 22 attorneys to copy contracts from formbooks so that they do not have to think carefully about language, and to follow practices that facilitate-as in 23 Cerberus-potentially ambiguous terms and that discount the careful drafting and reading of agreements. 24 While other scholarship has focused on specific methodologies or 25 doctrines of contract interpretation, this Article focuses on one set of facts 26 that arises in contract cases and was at issue in Cerberus: contracts that are ambiguous because of apparent inconsistencies. What unifies these cases 29. Of course, sloppiness is another cause of ambiguous drafting. See infra Part III.A.1. Furthermore, a party with less bargaining power than a counterparty to an agreement, e.g., a consumer entering into a form contract, might lack any "choice" but to accept ambiguous language in an agreement. besides the seemingly inconsistent terms is not any doctrine of contract interpretation, but rather the courts' message to lawyers to draft contracts clearly. That message is especially striking in Cerberus, in which the attorneys knowingly left remedies provisions in the Merger Agreement that were ambiguous and appeared to the court to be inconsistent. This gave rise to the 27 much bigger issue of the interpretation of those provisions and whether URI should have been entitled to the remedy of specific performance. Scholars have previously given attention to the benefits (especially economic) of lawyers intentionally drafting open, incomplete, and vague contracts, but Cerberus illustrated that lawyers also deliberately draft 28 contracts that are inconsistent. Although open, incomplete, and vague terms 29 should be encouraged in the drafting of contracts in certain circumstances, we should discourage rather than encourage ambiguity. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott do not believe that the goal in contract interpretation is to help courts get at the "correct answer," but rather to get parties to write in "the court's language." But Schwartz and Scott miss the mark in not accounting for 30 deliberate ambiguity in addressing what is the majoritarian default rule that courts should use to interpret contracts that are silent as to "judicial interpretive style." They suggest that the default should be the Willistonian 32. Id. Judge Posner asks whether this is a rule of interpretation because "[i]f the contract is clear, there is no need to interpret it. If it is unclear, the rule provides no guidance to extracting its meaning." Posner, supra note 19, at 1597. But the question of whether a contract is clear can be unclear itself (as it was, perhaps, in Cerberus), which leads to the question of whether the court will look at extrinsic evidence in answering this threshold question. The four corners rule is more limiting than the parol evidence rule, which bars the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of precontractual negotiations that contradicts the terms of an integrated agreement. See id. at 1602-03. The four corners rule also prohibits evidence of terms that supplement the terms of a written agreement. Id. at 1603. If terms or provisions of a contract are inconsistent, parol evidence should always be allowed to interpret that ambiguity, so the parol evidence rule is beyond the scope of this Article. However, because the four corners rule carries the risk of a court not identifying ambiguity in the first place, this Article addresses that rule in Parts II.D and V.C.
33. See infra note 113. 34. But see infra Part II.D. 35. See infra Part IV.B.1. Whether language is clear or unclear is relative and contextual. In this Article, "unclear language" is language from which it is unclear to what the parties assented at the time of contracting.
36. See infra Part IV.B.2. 37. Contractual ambiguity interferes with the courts' ability to ascertain parties' intentions from objective (as opposed to subjective) evidence. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427 (2000) ("The objective theory of contract formation and interpretation holds that the intentions of the parties to a contract or alleged contract are to be ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their unexpressed intentions.").
38. See Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 300-09 (1986), for a discussion of the consent theory of contract: "[A] consent theory specifies that a promisor incurs a contractual obligation the legal enforcement of which is morally justifiable by manifesting assent to legal four-corners rule, which bars parties from introducing extrinsic evidence to 32 show that the contract is ambiguous. The Willistonian approach enables parties to include ambiguous language in contracts when it suits their interests (i.e., "to get the deal done"), at the expense of courts having to make an imprecise judgment about whether the contract is ambiguous, which risks getting the result wrong (as Vice Chancellor Chandler might have done in Cerberus without a trial). (recognizing that consent plays a central role in contract law but arguing that contract law must set "appropriate limits of consent as a rationale for contract enforcement, particularly for enforcement of very harsh terms"). However, even in form contracts, a consent theory certainly favors clear language (or "plain English" as some call it). See infra Part IV.A. 39. Interpretation is the process by which courts give meaning to the words in a contract; whereas implication is the process by which courts supply terms to the contract that are not provided by the parties. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § § 7.7, 7.16, at 439, 483 (4th ed. 2004) . Of course, a court only supplies a term after interpreting the contract and finding that the contract does not provide for the contingency that arose. Id. § 7.16, at 483. The first two problems (open terms, incompleteness) discussed in Part I are issues of implication, and the final three (vagueness, ambiguity, inconsistent terms) are issues of interpretation.
40. Contra proferentem is a rule of interpretation that states that ambiguous language in a contract should be interpreted against the party who drafted the contract. It usually only applies where the drafting party has superior bargaining power to the non-drafting party. 11 RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 32:12, at 471-80 (4th ed. 1999) ("Indeed, any contract of adhesion, a contract entered without any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior bargaining power, is particularly susceptible to the rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter.").
41. See, e.g., Coates Expert Report, supra note 24, at 2 ("Attorneys negotiating buyout and other M&A agreements commonly economize on time and costs by using terms such as 'subject to' and 'notwithstanding' rather than attempting to synthesize provisions that would otherwise be partly or wholly potentially in conflict with one another."); Posting of Jeffrey Lipshaw to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/more_davidoffri_1.html (Dec. 24, 2007, 09:42 EST) ("My casual empiricism says lawyers [calculate the risk of losing in court versus the risk of not getting the deal done] all the time, in one form or another, but that the conclusion is almost always to let either difficult construction or even ambiguity stand for fear of wrecking the deal. . . . If I were to resort to behavioral psychology and economics, I'd suggest that risk aversion accounts for the ex ante choice-between taking the present deal and the risk of either losing the deal or having an adverse outcome in litigation, we select [T] he word 'chicken' standing alone is ambiguous."). In this classic case, the word "chicken" in the contract was vague, not ambiguous, because it had many possible meanings in the context of the parties' contract. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. The court concluded that "chicken" was used by the parties in the "broader sense" and included stewing chickens. Frigaliment Importing, 190 F. Supp. at 121.
45. Many of these interpretation problems also arise in the context of whether the agreement is a contract in the first place. In this Article, however, I am more interested in how courts supply or interpret terms when they find the existence of a contract.
46 district court could set a reasonable price for the natural gas if it could not discern from the evidence the price that the parties had intended if there was deregulation followed by a market drop); Lickley v. Max Herbold, Inc., 984 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Idaho 1999) (holding the court could decide on price where parties intended to enter into a contract but failed to negotiate price).
until they know the market price for the farmland at that time; they "agree to agree" on the price of farmland in one year. However, what if Frank and George cannot reach an agreement on the price of the farmland one year later?
The traditional approach to this type of problem is that there is no enforceable contract. Parties may not provide for all contingencies in a contract because all circumstances are unknown at the time of contracting (e.g., the market price at a later date) or, as Judge Posner notes, they may do so because they cannot agree on all terms at the time of entering into the contract. He writes, "Deliberate ambiguity may be a necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should the need arise. Professor Scott discusses whether agreements are "indefinite" (or "uncertain") and whether agreements are "incomplete" interchangeably. See id. at 1647-61. An "incomplete contract" is a contract nonetheless, and potentially raises questions of interpretation, which are the focus of this Article. To the extent that Professor Scott uses "incomplete" as a synonym for "indefiniteness" or "uncertainty," he is correct that an agreement must be definite enough to be enforceable. See ( holding that the plaintiff, who had an exclusive right to market the defendant's designs, had to use "reasonable efforts to bring profits and revenues into existence"). However, there is sometimes a difference between cases in which courts "disambiguate" a contract, or interpret a term provided by the parties, and cases in which courts fill gaps, or fill in terms in the contract. See Posner, supra note 19, at 1584-85. The latter more often also involve the threshold determination of whether a contract exists (and, therefore, whether the court should fill the gap in the first place).
Regardless of whether courts enforce or parties self-enforce incomplete contracts, lawyers cannot avoid drafting them. Incomplete contracts can 66 achieve the same efficiencies as contracts with open terms.
67

C. Vagueness
A vague term in a contract is one that has a range of meanings in context. As Professor Farnsworth wrote, "a word is vague to the extent that 68 it defines not a neatly bounded class but a distribution around a central norm." In discussing the vagueness case perhaps best known to first-year law 69 students, contracts professors have asked for decades, "What is a chicken?" 70 Or, suppose A Corp. agrees to buy B Corp. subject to A Corp.'s ability to obtain financing. A Corp. promises to use "best efforts" to obtain financing and close the deal. "Best efforts" does not have a discrete number of meanings in context and raises several interpretive questions once we assume that the agreement is definite enough to enforce. How many lenders does A Corp. by pointing out that while a vague statute does not satisfactorily define the proscribed conduct, one that does define prohibited conduct with some precision, but is subject to two or more different interpretations, is ambiguous."); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967) ("Ambiguity, properly defined, is an entirely distinct concept from that of vagueness. A word that may or may not be applicable to marginal objects is vague. But a word may also have two entirely different connotations so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly appropriate and inappropriate, as the word 'light' may be when applied to dark feathers. Such a word is ambiguous."); Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1585 n.205 (2005) ("There is, of course, a difference between 'vagueness' and 'ambiguity' in statutes; the former means the terms could describe an almost infinite range of activities (no clear lines at all), while the latter describes (typically a single term or phrase) that could have two meanings, and a court must decide which to use. The two are treated differently by the judiciary: vagueness can become a constitutional issue (depriving citizens of due process), which makes a statute void, while ambiguity is simply resolved with a tilt in favor of the defendant (the 'rule of lenity').").
The term "best efforts" is vague and, thus, the contract between A Corp. and B Corp. is incomplete. Most likely, A Corp. and B Corp. can self-enforce 73 A Corp.'s obligation to use "best efforts" without court intervention.
74
Regardless of whether a contract, such as that between A Corp. and B Corp., requires legal enforcement at some point, the lawyers' decision not to define vague terms more precisely saves on transaction costs in negotiating the deal and gives parties flexibility in completing a deal that perhaps has economic efficiencies. However, to the extent that the lawyers used "best efforts" to 75 mask that their clients had different understandings of the scope of A Corp.'s obligation to seek financing, their drafting raises some of the same issues that an ambiguous term raises, which is the focus of the remainder of this Article.
D. Ambiguity
An ambiguous term in a contract, as opposed to a vague term, is one in which there are two different meanings in context, such that one meaning excludes the others. The principal type of ambiguity is semantic or lexical 80. See, e.g., Konic Int'l Corp. v. Spokane Computer Servs., Inc., 708 P.2d 932, 934 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that there was no contract where parties disagreed on whether "fifty-six twenty" meant $5,620 or $56.20); Oswald v. Allen, 417 F.2d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that "minds of the parties had not met" because the plaintiff thought she was buying all the Swiss coins of the defendant, but the defendant only thought she was selling Swiss coins segregated by her into a special collection and "denominated by her as the Swiss Coin Collection" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
ambiguity. For example, if Mary says to John, "I saw a light truck," it is 77 unclear whether "light" refers to the color of the truck or its weight. However, ambiguity is context-dependent. For example, Mary writes to John that she will tutor John at 9:00 each Friday, and John was aware that Mary only tutors from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., it is unambiguous that the parties intended for the tutoring to take place at 9:00 in the morning. The focus of this Article is on language that is ambiguous in context.
Under an objective theory of contacts, "the court must first determine whether the contractual language in dispute is ambiguous. When the contract language, read in the context of the entire contract, is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, this 'objective' meaning will govern." 78 However, if the parties shared the same meaning of an ambiguous term at the time of contract, the prevailing view is that a court should interpret the contract in accordance with that meaning, even if under an objective standard of reasonableness the term would mean otherwise. When parties had 79 different understandings of a material term that is ambiguous, and both parties had no reason to be aware of the other party's understanding, the ambiguity is latent, and a court usually either finds that no contract was formed or 82. See, e.g., id. (stating that, where promisor was aware that the contract was unclear and interpretation would be necessary, it should not be able to escape liability by the court finding there was no contract); Centron DPL Co. v. Tilden Fin. Corp., 965 F.2d 673, 675 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is well settled, however, that where only one party knows or has reason to know of the different meaning attached by the other, that party is bound by the other party's meaning."). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 7.9, at 448-50.
83. There is a difference between contracts with inconsistent terms or provisions and contracts where a specific provision provides a limitation to a general provision. For an example of the latter, see Perry & Wallis, Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 722, 724 (Ct. Cl. 1970) ("This contract specifically defines 'actual necessary cost' as including 'all reasonable expenditures for material, labor, and supplies,' and then goes on to say that in no case will actual and necessary costs include an allowance for any 'general expense not directly attributable to the extra work.' We read this provision as plainly and directly refuting plaintiff's proffered interpretation. The term 'actual necessary cost' is narrowed down to exclude any and all expenses not directly attributable to the extra work. This is a clear expression of the government's intention to limit the base cost formula so as to exclude what plaintiff is now seeking." (emphasis added)).
84. Another situation arises when a provision in the contract cannot be performed because of a statute precluding its performance. In such cases courts have held that interpreting the provision in a way that is inconsistent with the statute is not reasonable. See, e.g., Sunshine v. M.R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 575 P.2d 847, 849 (Colo. 1978) (holding that lessors' interpretation of guaranty as 100 percent Small Business Association guaranty was unreasonable because 100 percent guaranty was not allowed by federal law).
85. Id. The legend also stated: "Void five years from date of issuance." Id. When the original purchaser of the warrant assigned it to O'Connor Investments (which sold it to Swiss Bank), Dresser reissued O'Connor a replacement certificate that stated on the first page that the warrant had to be exercised prior to April 5, 1996 (or by April 4, 1996). Id. at 690-91. The second page of the replacement certificate still stated that O'Connor had until the closing date or prior to April 6, 1996, to exercise the warrant. Id. at 691. As the first page of the replacement certificate contradicted both the second page and the original certificate, there could have been a question whether Swiss Bank could exercise the warrant on April 5, 1996. However, Swiss Bank waited until April 8, 1996, to exercise the certificate and argued that it was entitled to do so because April 5, 1996, was Good Friday and April 6 and 7 were the weekend. See id. at 691-92. The court found that it did not have to resolve the ambiguity as to whether Swiss Bank could exercise the warrant on April 5 because Swiss Bank could not delay exercising the warrant solely because of a legal holiday and the weekend. 
II. DOCTRINES TO INTERPRET INCONSISTENT TERMS
This Part discusses three doctrines that courts use to interpret inconsistent terms or provisions: (i) the forthright negotiator principle, (ii) contra proferentem, and (iii) the four corners rule. What is often at stake in the cases in which courts apply these doctrines is the message to parties to draft agreements clearly.
A. Cerberus and the Forthright Negotiator Principle
According to Vice Chancellor Chandler, "[t]he forthright negotiator principle provides that, in cases where the extrinsic evidence does not lead to a single, commonly held understanding of a contract's meaning, a court may consider the subjective understanding of one party that has been objectively manifested and is known or should be known by the other party. ("I have read the two provisions, and I don't think they are ambiguous. From the standpoint of the logical construction, the contract is doubly clear that the walk-away right dominates over the injunctive right. This, it seems to me, is as close as we come in the law to a semantical paradox, like the Liar's Paradox ('this sentence is false'). The problem is that the grammar and syntax are absolutely clear, but we rebel against the contradictory content."). While Professor Lipshaw is technically correct, this Article takes the perspective that there was no reason for Cerberus and URI to keep the injunctive right in the Merger Agreement because they understood that it could never have effect.
100 $100 million termination fee provided for in the Merger Agreement. URI 97 refused that "offer" and initiated an action for specific performance in the Delaware Court of Chancery under section 9.10 of the Merger Agreement five days after RAM indicated its intention to withdraw from the deal.
98
The dispute in Cerberus arose from two apparently inconsistent provisions in the Merger Agreement. Section 9.10 gave the parties the right Agreement upon breach by the other party and the right to receive a $100 million termination fee upon such breach. The dispute arose because section 102 8.2(e) of the Merger Agreement, the provision to which the specific performance provision was subject, precluded specific performance. 111. See United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 833. The relevant provision of section 9.10 provides, "The provisions of this Section 9.10 shall be subject in all respects to Section 8.2(e) hereof, which Section shall govern the rights and obligations of the parties hereto (and of the Guarantor, the Parent Related Entities, Agreement was sufficiently ambiguous to demand a trial. The agreement 104 was ambiguous because there were two apparently conflicting provisions on remedies in the event of breach and both parties had a reasonable interpretation of the provisions.
The court found the plaintiff's 105 interpretation-that it had the right to specific performance under section 9.10-reasonable, and while that right was subject to section 8.2(e), the termination fee was not the exclusive provision because (i) the $100 million termination fee was the "sole and exclusive remedy" only if the Merger Agreement was terminated (rather than breached) and both parties agreed that the Agreement had not been terminated, and (ii) the outright prohibition on equitable remedies in section 8.2(e) applied only to monetary equitable remedies like rescission and restitution.
106
The court also found the defendants' interpretation reasonable. The 107 defendants argued that while section 9.10 gave the plaintiff a right to specific performance, it was "subject to" section 8. Delaware law allowed them to establish the supremacy of one contractual provision over another, such that when terms of one provision are "subject to" the terms of another, the terms of the second provision control even if they nullify the first. The defendants contended that the plain meaning of 110 "equitable relief" includes specific performance, and that the phrase "in excess of" was in reference to "money damages"-not "equitable relief" and "monetary damages"-so that specific performance was not a type of relief contemplated in the Merger Agreement. ) (letter order denying motion for summary judgment) ("Having reviewed your briefs and supplemental letters regarding URI's motion for summary judgment, I have concluded that while the question is exceedingly close, summary judgment is not an effective vehicle for deciding the contract issues in dispute in this case. Although I am today denying URI's motion for summary judgment, I will provide more fully my reasons for doing so in the context of the post-trial opinion that will follow promptly after the conclusion of trial on Wednesday, December 19."). The court said the question was "exceedingly close" on the question of summary judgment but, in the end, found that that there were two reasonable interpretations of the apparently inconsistent provisions. United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 814, 830. Because there was not only one reasonable interpretation of the agreement, there was an issue of material fact that required the court to evaluate whether extrinsic evidence and summary judgment were inappropriate. See id. at 834. See also supra note 32. Likewise, the defendants would not have won if they had moved for summary judgment because they could not have satisfied their burden that only their interpretation of the Merger Agreement was reasonable. See United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 832 n.104. While Vice Chancellor Chandler said it "was exceedingly close" whether there was only one reasonable interpretation of the Merger Agreement, see id. at 832, he did not say whose interpretation nearly prevailed. His suggestion that URI would easily have defeated a motion for summary judgment perhaps suggests that URI would have won if he had decided the case on the "four corners" of the Merger Agreement alone. See M&A Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/12/the-dog-bites-c.html (Dec. 24, 2007, 05:59 EST) ("The Dog Bites: Coda"). Although Vice Chancellor Chandler stated that he denied URI's motion for summary judgment based on the Merger Agreement alone, see United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 830-34, he did have a preview of some of the extrinsic evidence (in the form of the parties' affidavits and letters) before making his decision. Thus, despite technically applying the four corners rule, we do not know the extent to which he was influenced by extrinsic evidence in denying summary judgment. He also had the luxury when ruling on the summary judgment motion of knowing that he, not the jury, would hear the extrinsic evidence. So there was perhaps little risk and little delay, see infra note 114, of holding a trial.
114. United Rentals, 937 A.2d at 814. How did this all happen so quickly? As one commentator noted:
[a]mong other things, this opinion shows how quickly the Chancery Court, in appropriate circumstances, can schedule a trial and issue a decision involving hundreds of millions of dollars within a few short weeks of the complaint being filed. The complaint in this case was filed, and discovery and a trial took place, as well as a summary judgment motion disposed of (by written decision . attorneys left section 9.10 in the Merger Agreement-the provision that URI contended gave it the right to specific performance. Peter Ehrenberg of Lowenstein, RAM's counsel, testified that he did not know why he left section 9.10 in the Merger Agreement and did not insist on its deletion. 
B. Cerberus Revisited: Getting Lawyers to Write Clearly
At the core of the "forthright negotiator principle" in Vice Chancellor Chandler's Cerberus decision is that parties should disclose their understanding of the terms they are negotiating to enable them to draft clear and unambiguous agreements, and to avoid the use of ambiguous or inconsistent language to hide disagreement or unresolved terms. As Vice Chancellor Chandler said, " [t] he evidence presented at trial conveyed a deeply flawed negotiation in which both sides failed to clearly and consistently communicate their client's positions." Although URI won, Vice Chancellor CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."). The doctrine applies only if the agreement is facially ambiguous. As one commentator noted, "[a]s potential ambiguities spring to mind, bear in mind that in order to apply contra proferentem, the language must be ambiguous 'as applied' to the factual case at hand." Michelle E. Boardman report that the type of drafting that the parties did in Cerberus (with two provisions, one that made the other superfluous) was acceptable to save time. 134 Consequently, the core of Vice Chancellor's decision delivers his message to deal lawyers to draft clearly. Professor Larry Ribstein agrees. He writes:
By contrast, Chandler chooses to emphasize a problem that's harder for the parties to fix-the need for ambiguity in order to simplify negotiations. Moreover, Chandler's resolution gives the parties an incentive to clearly communicate their intentions, which is another way to avoid the courts' involvement in sticky disputes like this.
So here we have a lesson for litigators as well as for drafters: if you want to persuade a court, particularly a Delaware judge, consider not only what's reasonable for the given case, but the signals the judge wants to send to future litigants. 135 The interpretation doctrines considered next are also different means to the same end: signaling to lawyers the importance of drafting without ambiguity.
C. Contra Proferentem
Contra proferentem is a rule of interpretation that provides that if a contract is ambiguous on its face, it is interpreted against the drafting party.
136
The reasoning behind this doctrine is that the party drafting the contract is often in a better position to write clear language to avoid uncertainty. agreement was drafted by Beanstalk, but this fact has little interpretive significance since AM General is a commercially sophisticated party represented by counsel. Most courts now agree with the exception to the principle that the contracts are to be construed against the party who drafted it."); Shelby Co. State Bank v. Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Not only should the drafter be penalized by bearing the costs ex post of having cut corners ex ante, the penalty of interpretation against the drafter also aims to avoid overbearing behavior between contracting parties where the drafter, often the one in the better bargaining position, tries to pull a fast one over the party who can merely accept or reject the contract as a whole."); First State Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Corp., 803 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (3d Cir. 1986) ("If an ambiguity does exist and if the insurer wrote the policy or is in a stronger bargaining position than the insured, the ambiguity is generally resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer. However, the principle that ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the situation where large corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power, are the parties to a negotiated policy.").
139 both parties have relatively equal bargaining power or are sophisticated or represented by counsel, the doctrine usually does not apply because both parties have the opportunity to review the agreement to prevent ambiguity. 138 In Klapp v. United Insurance Group Agency, Inc., the court applied 139 contra proferentem in hearing an appeal of a dispute that arose out of inconsistencies between an insurance agent's contract with his former employer (the Agent's Agreement) and the Agent's Manual that was incorporated into the contract. The plaintiff, an insurance agent who worked for the defendant, sued his former employer for renewal commissions that he argued had vested at the time of his retirement. The schedule in the Agent's 140 Agreement vested renewal commissions after two years of an agent's service, and the plaintiff's benefits were fully vested because he left the company after seven years. The Agent's Manual provided, "Retirement is understood to 141 be disengagement from the insurance industry. Vestment for retirement is age 65 or 10 years of service, whichever is later." The defendant argued that the 142 contract was not ambiguous; the plaintiff had not "retired" and thus his commissions had not vested because he neither worked for the insurance company for ten years nor reached the age of sixty-five when he left the company. The plaintiff, however, argued that the contract was ambiguous 143 and should be subject to interpretation by a jury. 147. Klapp, 663 N.W.2d at 459. The majority and concurrence disagreed over whether contra proferentem applied only in the case of a tie or whether it was a primary doctrine of construction. Compare id. at 459 ("Although the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it could consider relevant extrinsic evidence and that any ambiguities should be construed against the drafter pursuant to the rule of contra proferentem, the trial court failed to inform the jury that it could only apply the rule of contra proferentem if it was unable to discern the parties' intent from the extrinsic evidence."), with id. at 460 (Weaver, J., concurring) ("I would hold that when a contract is drafted entirely by one party, without any bilateral negotiations, the rule that a contract is to be strictly construed against its drafter should be applied as the primary rule of construction, not as a last resort, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to clarify ambiguity in the contract."). I doubt this difference is more than theoretical. On some level, the finder of fact, the jury in this case, is deciding how blameworthy the drafting party is for writing unclear language. That question is always going to be a matter of degree no matter what the rule is.
148. Id. at 461 (Weaver, J., concurring).
The trial court left it to the jury to decide which of the inconsistent provisions governed. The Michigan Supreme Court found that, as often 145 appears to be the case with contractual inconsistencies, interpretation could not be resolved from the "four corners" of the document and thus was an issue for the finder of fact-in this case, a jury and not the judge. The court also 146 found that the trial court's instruction to the jury to construe all ambiguities against the drafter was proper. In his concurrence, Justice Weaver explained 147 two rationales for the doctrine of contra proferentem as applied by the Michigan Supreme Court. First, "the rule provides a strong incentive for a party drafting a contract to use clear and unambiguous language." The rule, 148 like Vice Chancellor Chandler's opinion in Cerberus, discourages lawyers from using ambiguous language as a shortcut to reach an agreement. Second, Justice Weaver writes:
[T]he use of extrinsic evidence in circumstances involving ambiguity could be destabilizing to contractual relations and require more involved litigation by allowing parties to use assertions of oral understandings and examples of past behavior rather than relying on a written contract with the understanding that any ambiguity should be construed against its drafter.
149
As noted by Justice Weaver, in the rush to complete a deal, sloppy or deliberate inconsistencies can interfere with, rather than facilitate, contractual relations.
In McNeely v. Claremont Management Co., the court also applied 150 contra proferentem in response to a dispute that arose as to whether a printed or handwritten provision in the contract between a homebuilder and buyer controlled. The defendant built a house that was purchased by the plaintiffs, 151 and the defendant gave the plaintiffs a written warranty that the house was in substantial conformity with the plans and specifications approved by the Federal Housing Commissioner. The contract stated that the plaintiffs had 152 to give defendants notice of any breach of warranty within one year from the date of original conveyance of title to such Purchaser(s) or the date of initial occupancy of the dwelling, whichever first occurs: Provided further, however, that in the event the Purchaser(s) acquired title to the captioned property prior to the completion of construction of the dwelling thereon, such notice of nonconformity to the Warrantor may be given at any time or times within one year from the date of completion or initial occupancy of such dwelling, whichever first occurs.
153
Yet, the contract also contained this provision: The court found that even though the plaintiff gave notice more than one year after it began occupying the premises, the January 6, 1957, date prevailed. The court held that the specific provision (the date entered by the 158 defendant) prevailed over the general provision and the handwritten provision prevailed over the printed provision. This makes sense because the 159 handwritten provision was inserted later into the contract and offered the best chance to avert uncertainty. In addition, the court applied the doctrine of 160 contra proferentem and found that "since defendant is the party who prepared the warranty, it must bow to the decisive rule that the instrument must be interpreted most strongly against it since it is the party who caused the uncertainty to exist." The court's reasoning for applying the rule is 161 instructive; because the defendant could have avoided the uncertainty by making the printed and handwritten terms consistent, its interpretation should not prevail.
D. Four Corners Rule
The "four corners rule" is that a court should determine whether a contract is ambiguous from the "four corners" of the document, without considering extrinsic evidence. This is the rule that the court purportedly 162 applied in Cerberus. The problem is that ambiguity is not a black and white 167. Id. In passing, the court quoted a rule laid down by William Blackstone. Blackstone had articulated the following rule: "In a deed if there be two clauses so totally repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together, the first shall be received and the latter rejected." Id. at 603 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *381). About a century ago, the Oregon Supreme Court articulated a similar rule with regard to contracts-if in a contract two clauses are inconsistent, the first should govern-but with the limitation that the rule should apply only if consistent with other principles of interpretation. ur task when faced with such contradictory and inconsistent provisions of a contract is to reconcile them, if possible, in such a way that gives effect to the main purpose of the contract and avoids rendering some parts of the contract inoperative or meaningless").
171. It appears that the court took this approach and perhaps suggested that extrinsic evidence is never permissible to interpret a contract. Hardin, 13 P.2d at 604 ("It is also a universal rule of law that the issue, and a court is at risk of getting the "incorrect" answer, especially when parties deliberately introduce ambiguity into contracts.
In Hardin v. Dimension Lumber Co., the plaintiffs sold to the defendant 164 all the timber that could be cut from a particular tract of land for $1.25 per thousand feet of timber cut; yet, the contract also provided "that the entire sale and purchase price of said timber is $1400.00." The defendant paid $1,400 under the contract and thought it owed no more. The plaintiffs sought a 165 balance of $3,956, calculating the balance due based on $1.25 per thousand feet that the defendant cut and removed from their land. The dispute arose 166 about the contractual inconsistency over how much the defendant owed. The court interpreted the contract to mean that the plaintiffs owed the defendant $1.25 per thousand feet of timber cut, up to a maximum of $1,400. The court did not look beyond the "four corners" of the contract to 167 determine if the contract was ambiguous. The court noted that, if possible, 168 "inconsistent" terms should be interpreted as consistent with each other so that both inconsistent terms have effect. As the court stated, "[i]t is a rule of 169 universal application that a contract must be construed as a whole and effect must be given, if possible, to every word and phrase in it. This is one of the primary rules which is applicable not only to written contracts, but to writings generally." Under this application of the four corners rule, a court can 170 interpret even facial ambiguity, such as inconsistent terms or provisions, out of a contract. obligations of the parties to a written contract must be gathered from the four corners of the instrument, and that no part of a contract can be ignored as inconsistent with the general intent, if by any reasonable method of interpretation effect can be given to such part of the contract as well as to the remaining parts thereof."). 172. Judge Posner writes, "But it would be a mistake for courts to take the position that any ambiguity in a contract must be the product of a culpable mistake by one or both of the parties-that the judicial function in contract law is to punish parties who do not make their agreement clear." Posner, supra note 19, at 1583.
173. See, e.g., MACAULAY, KIDWELL & WHITFORD, supra note 20, at 243. Judge Posner notes that clumsiness in contract drafting is one cause of interpretation problems that arise in contract litigation. See Posner, supra note 19, at 1582. Of course, some lawyers deliberately use unclear language. See infra note 175.
174. For a critique of this category of sloppiness as a cause of contractual ambiguity, see Posting of Jeffrey Lipshaw to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/12/ the_cerberus_ca.html (Dec. 22, 2007, 09:57 EST) ("Perhaps it is because I have actually been in the shoes of an M&A lawyer trying to craft a linguistic solution, or have been the client of M&A lawyers trying to craft linguistic solutions for me, that I chuckle at the charges of 'sloppy drafting' as though lawyers have the absolute power (a reductive, rational, scientific, but unrealistic assumption) to control all outcomes through language. One of my rules of thumb in negotiating language was to change as little as possible to achieve the desired outcome. That's an art, not a science, and Cerberus' lawyer's judgment ultimately bore out in this case. Who knows what would have happened if he tried to make the change by deleting rather than trumping?").
If Vice Chancellor Chandler had followed this "universal" rule of application in Cerberus, URI likely would have prevailed. Under this rule, URI and Cerberus would have included the injunctive right only if they intended for it to have effect in certain cases and, therefore, Vice Chancellor Chandler could have found the termination fee and specific performance as alternatives for URI when Cerberus backed out of the agreement. Such a result would have made more sense if the court had confidence that the parties had expressed their intentions clearly. However, sloppy drafting and deliberate ambiguity also explain inconsistent provisions, where we turn next.
III. WHY DO LAWYERS DRAFT INCONSISTENT TERMS?
Oftentimes, there is a simple misunderstanding that creates ambiguous contract language. Additionally, many lawyers do a poor job of drafting ("To avoid long squabbles that would slow down the negotiating process, negotiators may deliberately use unclear language. Management or labor may want to avoid being pinned down on a contract issue or may feel that agreeing to something is better than not agreeing at all. Consequently, imprecise language may be used to draft a contract provision. Negotiators know that arbitrators can ultimately decide what the provision means and how it will be applied."); see also United Rentals, Inc. v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 845 (Del. Ch. 2007) (" [I] n fact, parties often riddle their agreements with a certain amount of ambiguity in order to reach a compromise."); Posner, supra note 19, at 1583 ("Deliberate ambiguity may be a necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, should the need arise."). Vice Chancellor Chandler and Judge Posner are likely using "ambiguity" as a synonym for "unclear," see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text, and not in accordance with the definition given in Part I.D of this Article. Ironically, this misuse itself creates ambiguity. But this Article defines "ambiguity" as it does to differentiate unclear language that might be desirable (open contracts, incompleteness, and vagueness), see supra note 28, from ambiguous language that is not desirable.
176. See, e.g., Murphree v. W.W. Transp., 797 So. 2d 268, 277 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) ("Some sloppiness in general language cannot override the specific reference to this corporation"); Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment Industry, 4 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2002) ("Just a quick comment. With respect to arbitration clauses in a contract, it is important that they are to be drafted carefully if they are going to be put in. I see so many contracts coming across my desk where there is sloppiness in the provisions in the agreement. The arbitration clause, to the extent that it is in there, has problems as well. So if you are going to have, and that is what I really think we are talking about with respect to the ethical obligation, if you made a conscious and careful decision with respect to a transaction that you want to contain a mediation or arbitration clause, it is not just one boilerplate clause. There are very different ways you can structure it. You can reserve rights. You can have certain rules apply, certain rules not apply; who is the mediator; how do you pick the mediator; are there any kind of limited subsequent rights to challenge the award? All of these things need to be carefully thought through, and so I think that is a really important issue to be thought through in terms of drafting.").
177. See Suchan & Scott, supra note 175, at 21-22. The three indices they used to evaluate the documents measured sentence and clause length and the number of single syllable and polysyllabic words.
Id.
178. Id. at 22.
illustrates.
Before discussing deliberate ambiguity, we will look at 175 sloppiness in contractual drafting as a source of ambiguity.
A. Sloppiness
Lawyers and judges have long bemoaned sloppiness in contracts.
176
According to a study of 1996 collective bargaining agreements by James Suchan and Clyde Scott, in which three formulas were used to measure the understandability of documents, 95 to 99 percent were "difficult" or "very 177 difficult" to understand. One index they used revealed that "the rank and 178 file would need more than 18 years of education-a college degree plus two years of graduate school-to unscramble a typical union-management 184. See Coates Expert Report, supra note 24, at 12 ("Having habituated themselves to these drafting techniques, deal attorneys rely on them even when a given potential conflict in contract provisions is known and clear, or when it would not be particularly expensive or time-consuming to redraft other potentially conflicting provisions in the contract."). While there might be some difference between "knowing" and "deliberate" ambiguity in some cases, especially where one party to the contract has less control over the language used (e.g., in a form contract where the consumer knows of an ambiguity but lacks the power to negotiate over language), that distinction is of little difference in a case like Cerberus, where both parties (and their lawyers) had enough leverage to negotiate over the language used in the agreement. This Article, in places, uses the phrase "conscious ambiguity" to refer to ambiguity that is either intentional or knowing. 
B. Conscious Ambiguity
Interestingly, Coates appears to condone an inconsistency even if the parties know about it. Of course, he was testifying for his client Cerberus, 184 which likely knew that the remedies provisions in the Merger Agreement were inconsistent. Professor Steven Davidoff, frequent M&A legal commentator, summarized the negotiation process in Cerberus:
I think we now have a confident view of how the negotiation occurred. Throughout the contract negotiation process the Cerberus side made it clear at all times that its contracting policy did not permit it to allow the Seller a specific performance remedy and the URI side pushed at all times to get them on the hook if the financing was available. URI tried to do that that in many ways on all three agreements (merger agreement, limited guarantee, equity commitment letter) without making all the progress they wanted.
The Cerberus legal team was under strict orders to keep the out clear to their side; Simpson [Thacher & Bartlett LLP] via [Eric] Swedenburg ultimately was under pressure to get Cerberus signed up as best he could. I believe he was lucky that the other side allowed 9.10 to stay in subject to 8.2(e) even if 8.2(e)'s final sentence added by [Peter] Ehrenberg reduced URI's optionality to force it to accept the payment of the reverse termination fee in a Cerberus breach. And, think about it, one can reasonably conclude from the evidence that URI and Simpson adopted this strategy deliberately-if so, they did a fantastic job given their hand even if Swedenburg was found not to be a forthright negotiator (there are other explanations here but for now let's take this one). According to Chandler, he almost succeeded and no doubt Chandler realized the higher probabilities of being reversed on summary judgment versus a trial and that must have factored into his thinking to deny summary judgment to URI. Sloppy drafting helped URI much more than Cerberus. At the time the deal was executed, it may be that URI took a calculated risk that Cerberus wouldn't take the reputational hit of walking and (unfortunately) was wrong. partner [who does private equity deals], says he guesses Ehrenberg was probably trying to tread lightly: 'He used the 'subject to' trick to knock out a conflicting provision and went on his merry way.'" Hallman, supra note 6. Even if Cerberus's attorneys were not aware of the full risk of being subject to the injunctive right, they were likely aware of the potential inconsistency. Hallman, a reporter who interviewed private equity deal lawyers and contract drafting experts about the case, describes, "Kevin Rinker, a Debevoise & Plimpton partner who practices in the area of private equity and who presented a case study of the deal to his fellow partners, agrees with this analysis. From the testimony, he says, it appears Ehrenberg won a point during the negotiations but then failed to clearly articulate it in the contract." Kenneth Adams, a former Jones Day and Winston & Strawn lawyer who now advises law firms on contract matters, goes a step further. "It was a major failure of drafting," he says. "What happens if and when someone walks is a do-not-pass-go issue." Id. Hallman also writes, "Lawyers familiar with the deal say they believe the United Rentals case offers a glimpse into a little-noticed but common practice: Deal lawyers often agree to contracts with ambiguous language for the sake of compromise. and that an injunctive right (apparently inconsistent with, and negated by, the walk-away right) was the best that URI could get because Cerberus did not want the equitable option in the contract. Cerberus's attorneys likely knew of the apparent inconsistency as well, but thought that making the injunctive right "subject to" the walk-away right was enough to protect their client from specific performance. Even Vice Chancellor Chandler suggested that the 186 parties might have deliberately drafted inconsistent provisions when he said:
As with many contract disputes, hindsight affords the Court a perspective from which it is clear that this case could have been avoided: if Cerberus had simply deleted section 9.10(b), the contract would not be ambiguous, and URI would not have filed this suit. The law of contracts, however, does not require parties to choose optimally clear language; in fact, parties often riddle their agreements with a certain amount of ambiguity in order to reach a compromise.
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By not insisting on eliminating the injunctive right from the Merger Agreement altogether, Cerberus cost itself a lawsuit and, more significantly, risked having to complete the merger with URI.
Even though URI lost, it did preserve its litigation option by getting Cerberus to agree to keep the specific performance provision in the Merger Agreement. URI could have won on its gamble had the Court of Chancery specifically enforced the Agreement. 190. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 38, at 269 ("We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally justified. We look to contract theory, in particular, to tell us which interpersonal commitments the law ought to enforce." (footnote omitted)).
191. criticizes the deliberate use of language to create an inconsistency (even when used in an effort "to get the deal done").
IV. THE CASE AGAINST CONSCIOUS AMBIGUITY
It is a long-heeded cannon that lawyers have an obligation to be zealous advocates for their clients. Therefore, why should a lawyer not introduce 189 ambiguity into an agreement if it gives the client additional leverage in the course of performance and a better litigation strategy should the deal break up? The answer is found in contract theory, as well as the lawyer's professional obligations to her client and to the integrity of the profession.
A. Consent
The overriding question of contract law is when the state should use its power to enforce a promise. A goal of contract law suggested by courts and 195. Cf. id. at 308 ("This also explains why the misuse of a particular term by party A who was unaware of its ordinary meaning would not bind A if it could be shown that B, the other party, was made aware of this mistake by the circumstances of the transaction. Proof of this occurrence would show that the normal boundary-defining function of an objective approach designed to protect parties in B's position had been satisfied by B's actual knowledge of A's meaning. A consent theory, therefore, explains both why parties are free to shift away from the ordinary meanings of words or deeds either intentionally or inadvertently, and why, if a shift by both cannot be shown, the ordinary or 'objective' meaning will govern.") (footnote omitted).
196. Interpreting inconsistent contract provisions requires subjectivity-and it is this subjectivity that often undermines the identification process. 196 Barnett explains how parties must be able to ascertain a contract's boundaries clearly:
In contract law, this informational or "boundary defining" requirement means that an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. Without a manifestation of assent that is accessible to all affected parties, that aspect of a system of entitlements that governs transfers of rights will fail to achieve its main function. At the time of the transaction, it will have failed to identify clearly and communicate to both parties (and to third parties) the rightful boundaries that must be respected. Without such communication, parties to a transaction (and third parties) cannot accurately ascertain what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment on which they can rely. Disputes that might otherwise have been avoided will occur, and the attendant uncertainties of the transfer process will discourage reliance.
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Despite the conventional wisdom that ambiguity enables parties "to get deals done," the uncertainty that ambiguity creates has the potential to decrease rather than increase contractual reliance. The Merger Agreement in Cerberus left URI, Cerberus, and any third party who relied on it unable to know what the parties' respective rights were.
The primary alternative to autonomy-based theories is standard-based theories, the primary one of which is efficiency. Under an efficiency theory, 198 parties contract to maximize net social welfare or wealth (somehow defined). The primary problem with an economics approach to contract law 199 is that it does not explain adequately which contracts are enforceable and which are not; it does not explain why only voluntary promises are enforced. There was no sign in Cerberus or the other ambiguity cases 200 discussed in this Article that an efficiency theory helped courts get at the "correct answer."
B. Professional Obligations
This subpart discusses why an attorney's obligations to his or her client and the profession could require him or her to refrain from consciously including ambiguous contract language without disclosing it to the other contracting party.
Duty to the Client
Model Rule 1.1 requires that "[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Lawyers should avoid conscious ambiguity if it interferes 201 with their duty of competent representation because the client would be better served by clear language. 202 In certain cases, a lawyer could cost a client money by drafting an ambiguous contract. For example, a contract written in plain English could save management money by avoiding unnecessary grievances, costly arbitration hearings, and even work stoppages caused by worker discontent over a misinterpreted contract provision. The lawyer could also hurt the 203 client's legal position by using ambiguous language. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in a 2007 decision that federal courts may not review an arbitrator's interpretation of language if the language is ambiguous or arguably equivocal. Because the language of the 204 contract was ambiguous in that case, the arbitrator was able to interpret it however he wanted and against the appellant. The appellant's lawyer could 205 have avoided the adverse result and preserved the client's right to judicial review had the language in the contract been drafted clearly (in support of the appellant's position). 213. To the extent that the reason for ambiguous language is sloppiness, there are many possible ways to address this problem, including more skills-based training in law school and more mentoring of law firm associates. Another possibility is that lawyers might be less likely to cut corners in drafting and editing documents if they billed on a per-deal rather than a per-hour basis so that their clients put less pressure on them to reduce their hours billed.
Duty to the Profession
party (who would perhaps be disadvantaged by the missing term) that the term was missing. The Committee said: 208 Where the lawyer for a has received for signature from the lawyer for b the final transcription of a contract from which an important provision previously agreed upon has been inadvertently omitted by the lawyer for b, the lawyer for a, unintentionally advantaged, should contact the lawyer for b to correct the error and need not consult a about the error. 209 Further, in Hennig v. Ahearn, the court held that a lawyer possibly had a duty to disclose to the other party where it made a material alteration to the written contract at the last minute, without telling the other party. It is also 210 possibly a violation of the disciplinary rules in a case in which the contractual term is not missing but it is patently ambiguous, e.g., inconsistent, for the lawyer with knowledge of the ambiguity not to disclose it to the other party.
Although a lawyer should be a zealous advocate, there should be a limit 211 on that zealousness. In cases of conscious ambiguity, a lawyer should be 212 under an obligation to disclose the ambiguity to the other party to the contract. The other party might agree to the ambiguous language but, more often than not, the parties might eliminate the ambiguity. While Cerberus is perhaps a borderline case because URI's attorneys had reason to know of the ambiguous language, URI's attorneys still had an obligation to disclose and seek Cerberus's agreement to the inconsistencies in the Merger Agreement.
V. DOCTRINES TO DISCOURAGE CONSCIOUS AMBIGUITY
This Article does not propose sweeping reform to legal education and legal practice so that lawyers draft clearer contracts, nor does it 216. As a matter of doctrine, the obscurity of the principle should not undermine its significance. It is true that most contracts in general, and M&A deals in particular, never reach a courtroom because "the agreements fall within the self-enforcing range or can be enforced with reputational sanctions." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 30, at 557. However, the widespread publication of the principle itself gives lawyers an incentive to avoid "conscious ambiguity" in the first place.
217. See Barnett, supra note 38, at 308 ("But unlike a will theory, a consent theory, because it is based on fundamental notions of entitlements, can explain both why we generally enforce the objective manifestation of consent when it differs from subjective intent and the exceptions where evidence of subjective intent will prevail.").
218. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 39, § 9.3, at 605 ("A mutual mistake occurs when both parties are under substantially the same erroneous perception as to the facts.").
comprehensively detail how the rules of professional responsibility can be used to deter conscious ambiguity. However, it begins to address the role of contract doctrine and theory in preventing these problems. Part III of this Article discussed three doctrines that courts have used in interpreting ambiguous contracts with inconsistencies. This part revisits those doctrines in the context of courts disincentivizing conscious ambiguity, suggesting that courts apply the forthright negotiator principle and contra proferentem, and reject the four corners rule.
A. The Forthright Negotiator Principle
The attention that Vice Chancellor Chandler's opinion gave to the forthright negotiator principle is a welcome development in contracts law. Vice Chancellor Chandler could have merely cited the relevant restatement section. However, by invoking the concept of a "forthright negotiator," the 214 opinion leaves the impression that URI's lawyers were not forthright in insisting upon and agreeing to an injunctive right in the Merger Agreement, knowing full well that Cerberus's lawyers thought the injunctive right was irrelevant in light of the limitation of URI's remedies to the reversetermination fee. This impression is at least consistent with the ethical obligations of URI's attorneys, and, apart from the substance of the 215 forthright negotiator doctrine, suggests to deal lawyers that they should avoid, or at least disclose, ambiguity in the first instance. That should decrease the 216 need to apply the forthright negotiator principle.
As a doctrinal matter, the objective theory of contract has never shunned subjective intentions entirely. For example, a party to a contract can 217 introduce subjective evidence to show that there was a mutual mistake at the time of contracting. In Cerberus, the written contract was unhelpful in 218 interpreting whether the parties intended for URI to have an injunctive right upon Cerberus's breach, so a repudiation of subjective evidence would have required Vice Chancellor Chandler to guess at what the parties had intended. Because we do not want to hold parties to promises to which they did not manifest assent, the forthright negotiator principle is helpful. When a party, 219 such as URI in Cerberus, knows or has reason to know of the other party's subjective intentions, it agrees to be bound by them if the language as to those intentions in the parties' agreement is ambiguous.
B. Contra Proferentem
The focus of this Article so far has largely been on M&A deals and other contracts where both parties are sophisticated and are represented by counsel, and where the parties have relatively equal bargaining power. In this context, such as in Cerberus, it is difficult to think of only one party as the drafter (and therefore more responsible for the language in the contract) because often attorneys copy stock clauses and exchange drafts of the contract several 220 times.
Many of these contracts even have a clause precluding the 221 application of contra proferentem, i.e., a clause that the contract should not be construed against the party who drafted the contract. 222 However, in a form contract, such as an insurance or other type of consumer contract, one party often has no leverage over the terms of the agreement. Where only one party has the responsibility for drafting 223 language, application of contra proferentem, either as a tie-breaker or as a primary rule of construction, gives that party at least some disincentive to 224 introduce ambiguity into the contract. 225 This does not mean that contra proferentem, especially as applied, is without its critics. Michelle Boardman argues that when contra proferentem is used in insurance contracts, it creates a feedback loop where insurance companies have no incentive to clarify in what historically has been unclear boilerplate in insurance contracts. Boardman argues that courts use contra 226 proferentem to interpret even those contracts that are not ambiguous, giving the insurance companies certainty in how courts interpret terms, which allows them to account for the outcome (in addition to the risk) of litigation in their pricing of insurance. Of course, her criticism is with contra proferentem as 227 applied and not with the doctrine itself, and courts should not find ambiguity in contracts unless it exists. To the extent that consumer contracts remain unreadable, the solution might be in other judicial and legislative checks. 228 229
C. Four Corners Rule
This Article rejects the position of Professors Schwartz and Scott. They advocate applying the four corners rule, or Willistonian rule, of contract interpretation as the majoritarian default rule that most parties would prefer courts to apply. To think of the four corners rule as a default rule is 230 problematic in and of itself, as it is an evidentiary rule that courts do not give parties the discretion to choose. However, it is also unclear whether most parties would prefer this default. Some parties might choose it-e.g., URI in Cerberus, as it would have given the equipment lessor the best chance of winning-but other parties would not-e.g., Cerberus, whose case was stronger because the court fully evaluated the extrinsic evidence. Moreover, there is an irony in introducing interpretative questions over rules of interpretation "in creating an incentive for parties to write contracts in majority talk [or language understood by the court]." 231 Schwartz and Scott's idea that the four corners rule would make courts most likely to interpret contracts consistent with what the parties intended does not necessarily follow. For example, even if URI and Cerberus were to choose in the Merger Agreement the four corners rule as the court's interpretative style upon default, URI would not have had any incentive to abandon the injunctive right and eliminate the apparent inconsistencies that ultimately confronted the court. In a choice between a superseded injunctive right and no injunctive right at all, the first gave Cerberus a better chance in litigation than the second. While I agree with Schwartz and Scott that contracts that are understandable by the courts is the goal, abandoning extrinsic evidence in the court's consideration of whether a contract is ambiguous will not, in some cases, produce clearer contracts. Without courts considering extrinsic evidence, the incentive for conscious ambiguity still exists.
232
In Cerberus, Vice Chancellor Chandler applied the four corners rule, but made the correct decision. Cerberus illustrates two problems with the rule.
233
Even when the court purports to be applying the four corners rule, there is nothing to preclude the court from considering extrinsic evidence. The 234 rule's impact is therefore likely overstated. Second, as in Cerberus where the court was potentially "exceedingly close" to getting the "incorrect answer" without hearing the extrinsic evidence, the four corners rule almost 
VI. CONCLUSION: EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS
The negotiations preceding the URI-Cerberus merger, the ensuing lawsuit, and Vice Chancellor Chandler's opinion offer valuable lessons for deal lawyers. However, at the core, Cerberus was nothing more than a "good, old-fashioned contract case of buyer's remorse." Though old-fashioned, 236 Cerberus offers an excellent case study of conscious ambiguity-lawyers agreeing to contract language that they most likely knew had the appearance of inconsistency. If URI had prevailed, the overriding message to take away from the case might have been how URI's lawyers leveraged language to negotiate a deal and to exercise their litigation option when the deal went awry, and how Cerberus's attorneys stood idle while the parties signed a Merger Agreement that potentially preserved an injunctive option for URI to which Cerberus did not agree. Instead, because Cerberus was successful, the message to deal lawyers is to draft contracts clearly and not to use consciously ambiguous language as a negotiation tactic in trying to reach a deal.
While Cerberus raises significant doctrinal, theoretical, and ethical issues, it leaves deal lawyers and contract scholars with lingering questions regarding the reality of how lawyers draft contracts. In broad terms, the 237 question remains of the extent to which Professor Coates in his expert report in Cerberus accurately captured M&A drafting practices.
More specifically, do lawyers intentionally draft contracts with ambiguous language to facilitate getting "the deal done"? Do lawyers find such a practice acceptable? The answer is likely not so black and white. Is there a point where language is so unclear (e.g., it is sufficiently ambiguous even in context because it is inconsistent) that lawyers would not leave it in a contract even if it benefited their client? Do lawyers perceive that they have an obligation to identify language that is inconsistent with the parties' agreement and disclose its existence to lawyers representing other parties to the deal? Do the answers to these questions differ between men and women, across races, or among lawyers practicing in various geographical locations?
The other group of questions revolves around the extent to which lawyers perceive that unclear language (either as a result of sloppiness or "planned obfuscation") is necessary "to get deals done." Are the cost and time pressures on lawyers so great that they cannot review each provision of a merger 238. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 136, at 1106 ("The problem is in fullest bloom in the insurance context. Insurers will cling for decades to language that courts continually declare ambiguous and construe against the insurer."). agreement closely? Are uses of "subject to" and "notwithstanding" and other linguistic shortcuts the most effective way to articulate their agreements and, if not, do lawyers feel that the legal and business culture requires them to use those terms? Most significantly, do lawyers perceive that they need to use language that is ambiguous at the risk of not otherwise consummating a deal?
Cerberus as protector of the underworld is only a myth. But the vivid image of the mythological beast should paint a colorful reminder of the pitfalls for lawyers of intentionally drafting unclear language the next time that they negotiate a contract. Courts can do their part in using doctrine, such as the forthright negotiator principle and contra proferentem, that discourages conscious ambiguity in drafting. In the case of consumer contracts, further judicial and legislative intervention might be necessary to reverse a longstanding practice of unclear boilerplate. As for contracts scholars, this 238 Article should be only the beginning of the study of drafting practices in M&A deals.
